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Abstract
Online reviews have become a vital source of infor-
mation in purchasing a service (product). Opinion
spammers manipulate reviews, affecting the over-
all perception of the service. A key challenge in
detecting opinion spam is obtaining ground truth.
Though there exists a large set of reviews online,
only a few of them have been labeled spam or non-
spam. In this paper, we propose spamGAN, a gen-
erative adversarial network which relies on limited
set of labeled data as well as unlabeled data for
opinion spam detection. spamGAN improves the
state-of-the-art GAN based techniques for text clas-
sification. Experiments on TripAdvisor dataset show
that spamGAN outperforms existing spam detection
techniques when limited labeled data is used. Apart
from detecting spam reviews, spamGAN can also
generate reviews with reasonable perplexity.
1 Introduction
Opinion spam is a widespread problem in e-commerce, so-
cial media, travel sites, movie review sites, etc. [Jindal et al.,
2010]. Statistics show that more than 90% of the consumers
read reviews before making a purchase [Hub, 2018]. The like-
lihood of purchase is also reported to increase when there are
more reviews. Opinion spammers try to exploit such financial
gains by providing spam reviews which influence readers and
thereby affect sales. We consider the problem of identifying
spam reviews as a classification problem, i.e., given a review,
it needs to be classified either as spam or non-spam.
One of the main challenges in identifying spam reviews
is the lack of labeled data, i.e., spam and non-spam la-
bels [Rayana and Akoglu, 2015]. While there exists a corpus
of online reviews only few of them are labeled. This is mainly
because manual labeling is often time consuming, costly and
subjective [Li et al., 2018]. Research shows that unlabeled
data, when used in conjunction with small amounts of labeled
data can produce considerable improvement in learning accu-
racy [Ott et al., 2011]. There is very limited research on using
semi-supervised learning techniques for opinion spam detec-
tion [Crawford et al., 2015]. The existing semi-supervised
∗This paper has been accepted at IJCAI 2019.
learning approaches [Li et al., 2011; Herna´ndez et al., 2013;
Li et al., 2014] for identifying opinion spam use pre-defined
set of features for training their classifier. In this paper, we
will use deep neural networks which automatically discovers
features needed for classification [LeCun et al., 2015].
Deep generative models have shown promising results for
semi-supervised learning [Kumar et al., 2017]. Specifically,
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [Goodfellow et al.,
2014] which have the ability to generate samples very close
to real data, have achieved state-of-the art results. However,
most research on GANs are for images (continuous values)
and not text data (discrete values) [Fedus et al., 2018].
GANs operate by training two neural networks which play
a min-max game: discriminator D tries to discriminate real
training samples from fake ones and generator G tries to gen-
erate fake training samples to fool the discriminator. The main
drawback with GANs is that: 1) when the data is discrete,
the gradient from the discriminator may not be useful for im-
proving the generator. This is because, the slight change in
weights brought forth by the gradients may not correspond to a
suitable discrete mapping in the dictionary [Husza´r, 2015]; 2)
the discrimination is based on the entire sentence not parts of
it, giving rise to the sparse rewards problem [Yu et al., 2017].
Existing works on GANs for text data generation are lim-
ited by the length of the sentence that can be generated, e.g.,
MaskGAN [Fedus et al., 2018] considers 40 words per sen-
tence. These approaches may not be suitable for processing
most online reviews, which are relatively lengthy. For exam-
ple, the TripAdvisor review dataset used in our experiments
has sentences with median length 132. Further, GANs have
also not been fully investigated for text classification tasks.
In this paper, we propose spamGAN, a semi-supervised
GAN based approach for classifying opinion spam. spamGAN
uses both labeled instances and unlabeled data to correctly
learn the input distribution, resulting in better prediction ac-
curacy for comparatively longer reviews. spamGAN consists
of 3 different components: generator, discriminator, classifier
which work together to not only classify spam reviews but
also generate samples close to the train set. We conduct ex-
periments on TripAdvisor dataset and show that spamGAN
outperforms existing works when using limited labeled data.
Following are the main contributions of this paper: 1) we
propose spamGAN: a semi-supervised GAN based model to
detect opinion spam. To the best of our knowledge, we are
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the first to explore the potential of GANs for spam detection;
2) the proposed GAN model improves the state-of-the-art
GAN based models for semi-supervised text classification;
3) most existing research on opinion spam (other than deep
learning methods) manually identify heuristics/features for
classifying spamming behavior, however in our GAN based
approach, the features are learned by the neural network; 4)
experiments show that spamGAN outperforms state-of-the art
methods in classifying spam when limited labeled data is used;
5) spamGAN can also generate spam/non-spam reviews very
similar to the training set which can be used for synthetic data
generation in cases with limited ground truth.
2 Related Work
Most existing opinion spam detection techniques are super-
vised methods based on pre-defined features. [Jindal and
Liu, 2008] used logistic regression with product, review and
reviewer-centric features. [Ott et al., 2011] used n-gram fea-
tures to train a Naive Bayes and SVM classifier. [Feng et al.,
2012; Mukherjee et al., 2013; Li et al., 2015] used part-of-
speech tags and context free grammar parse trees, behavioral
features, spatio-temproal features, respectively. [Wang et al.,
2011; Akoglu et al., 2013] used graph based algorithms.
Neural network methods for spam detection consider the re-
views as input wihtout specific feature extraction. GRNN [Ren
and Ji, 2017] used a gated recurrent neural network to
study the contexual information of review sentences. DRI-
RCNN [Zhang et al., 2018] used a recurrent network for learn-
ing the contextual information of the words in the reviews.
DRI-RCNN extends RCNN [Lai et al., 2015] by learning em-
bedding vectors with respect to both spam and non-spam labels
for the words in the reviews. Since RCNN and DRI-RCNN
use neural networks for spam classification, we will use these
supervised methods for comparison in our experiments.
Few semi-supervised methods for opinion spam detection
exist. [Li et al., 2011] used co-training with Naive-Bayes clas-
sifier on reviewer, product and review features. [Herna´ndez et
al., 2013; Li et al., 2014] used only positively labeled samples
along with unlabeled data. [Rayana and Akoglu, 2015] used
review features, timestamp, ratings as well as pairwise markov
random field network of reviewers and product to build a
supervised algorithm along with semi-supervised extensions.
Other un-supervised methods for spam detection [Xu et al.,
2015] exists, but, they are out of the scope of this work.
The ongoing research on GANs for text classification aim
to address the drawbacks of GANs in generating sentences
with respect to the gradients and the sparse rewards problem.
SeqGAN [Yu et al., 2017] addresses them by considering se-
quence generation as a reinforcement learning problem. Monte
Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) is used to overcome the issue
of sparse rewards, however it is computationally intractable.
StepGAN [Tuan and Lee, 2018] and MaskGAN [Fedus et
al., 2018] use the actor-critic [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2000]
method to learn the rewards, however MaskGAN is limited
by length of the sequence. Further, all of them focus on sen-
tence generation. CSGAN [Li et al., 2018] deals with sentence
classification, but it uses MCTS and character-level embed-
dings. spamGAN differs from CSGAN in using the actor-critic
reinforcement learning method for sequence generation and
word-level embeddings, suitable for longer sentences.
3 spamGAN
In this section, we will present the problem set-up, the three
components of spamGAN as well as their interactions through
a sequential decision making framework.
3.1 Problem Set-up
Let DL be the set of reviews labeled spam or non-spam. Given
the cost of labeling, we hope to improve classification perfor-
mance by also using DU, a significantly larger set of unlabeled
reviews1. Let D = DL ∪ DU be a combination of labeled
and unlabeled sentences for training2. Each training sentence
y1:T = {y1, y2, . . . yt, . . . , yT } consists of a sequence of T
word tokens, where yt ∈ Y represents the tth token in the
sentence and Y is a corpus of tokens used. For sentences be-
longing to DL, we also include a class label belonging to one
of the 2 classes c ∈ C : {spam, non-spam}.
To leverage both the labeled and unlabeled data, we include
three components in spamGAN: the generator G, the discrimi-
nator D, and the classifier C as shown in Fig. 1. The generator,
for a given class label, learns to generate new sentences (we
call them fake3 sentences) similar to the real sentences in
the train set belonging to the same class. The discriminator
learns to differentiate between real and fake sentences, and
informs the generator (via rewards) if the generated sentences
are unrealistic. This competition between the generator and
discriminator improves the quality of the generated sentence.
We know the class labels for the fake sentences produced
by the generator as they are controlled [Hu et al., 2017], i.e.,
constrained by class labels {spam, non-spam}. The classifier
is trained using real labeled sentences from DL and fake sen-
tences produced by the generator, thus improving its ability
to generalize beyond the small set of labeled sentences. The
classifier’s performance on fake sentences is also used as feed-
back to improve the generator: better classification accuracy
results in more rewards. While the discriminator and gener-
ator are competing, the classifier and generator are mutually
bootstrapping. As the 3 components of spamGAN are trained,
the generator produces sentences very similar to the training
set while the classifier learns the characteristics of spam and
non-spam sentences in order to identify them correctly.
3.2 Generator
If PR(y1:T , c) is the true joint distribution of sentences y1:T
and classes c ∈ C from the real training set, the gener-
ator aims to find a parameterized conditional distribution
G(y1:T |z, c, θg) that best approximates the true distribution.
The generated fake sentence is conditioned on the network
parameters θg , noise vector z, and class label c, which are sam-
pled from the prior distribution Pz and Pc, respectively. z and
c together make up the context vector. The context vector is
1DU includes both spam/non-spam reviews.
2Training (see Alg. 1) can use only DL or both DL and DU.
3Fake sentences are those produced by the generator. Spam sen-
tences are deceptive sentences with class label spam. Generator can
generate fake sentences belonging to {spam or non-spam} class.
Figure 1: spamGAN Architecture
concatenated to the generated sentence at every timestep [Tuan
and Lee, 2018], ensuring that the actual class labels for each
generated fake sentence is retained.
While sampling from G(y1:T |z, c, θg), the word tokens are
generated auto-regressively, decomposing the distribution over
token sequences into the ordered conditional sequence,
G(y1:T |z, c, θg) =
T∏
t=1
G(yt|y1:t−1, z, c, θg) (1)
During pre-training, we use batches of real sentences from
D and minimize the cross-entropy of the next token condi-
tioned on the preceding ones. Specifically, we minimize the
loss (Eqn. 2) over real sentence-class pairs (y1:T , c) from DL
as well as unlabeled real sentences from DU with randomly-
assigned class labels drawn from the class prior distribution.
LGMLE = −
T∑
t=1
log G(yt|y1:t−1, z, c, θg) (2)
During adversarial training, we treat sequence generation
as a sequential decision making problem [Yu et al., 2017].
The generator acts as a reinforcement learning agent and is
trained to maximize the expected rewards using policy gra-
dients, where the rewards are feedback obtained from the
discriminator and classifier for the generated sentences (See
Sec. 3.5). For implementation, we use a unidirectional multi-
layer recurrent neural network with gated recurrent units as
the base cell to represent the generator.
3.3 Discriminator
The discriminator D, with parameters θd predicts if a sentence
is real (sampled from PR) or fake (produced by the gener-
ator) by computing a probability score D(y1:T |θd) that the
sentence is real. Like [Tuan and Lee, 2018] instead of com-
puting the score at the end of the sentence, the discriminator
produces scores for every timestep QD(y1:t−1, yt), which are
then averaged to produce the overall score.
D(y1:T |θd) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
QD(y1:t−1, yt) (3)
QD(y1:t−1, yt) is the intermediate score for timestep t and
is based solely on the preceding partial sentence, y1:t. In a
setup reminiscent of Q-learning, we consider QD(y1:t−1, yt)
to be the estimated value for the state s = y1:t−1 and action
a = y. Thus, the discriminator provides estimates for the
true state-action values without the additional computational
overhead of using MCTS rollouts.
We train the discriminator like traditional GANs by maxi-
mizing the scoreD(y1:T |θd) for real sentences and minimizing
it for fake ones. This is achieved by minimizing the loss L(D),
L(D)= E
y1:T∼PR
− [logD(y1:T |θd)]+ E
y1:T∼G
−[log (1−D(y1:T |θd))]
(4)
We also include a discrimination critic Dcrit [Konda and
Tsitsiklis, 2000] which is trained to approximate the score
QD(y1:t−1, yt) from the discriminator network, for the next
token yt based on the preceding partial sentence y1:t−1. The
approximated score VD(y1:t−1) will be used to stabilize policy
gradient updates for the generator during adversarial training.
VD(y1:t−1) = E
yt
[
QD(y1:t−1, yt)
]
(5)
Dcrit is trained to minimize the sequence mean-squared
error between VD(y1:t−1) and the actual scoreQD(y1:t−1, yt).
L(Dcrit) = E
y1:T
T∑
t=1
∥∥QD(y1:t−1, yt)− VD(y1:t−1)∥∥2 (6)
The discriminator network is implemented as a unidirec-
tional Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) with one dense output
layer which produces the probability that a sentence is real
at each timestep, i.e., QD(y1:t−1, yt). For the discrimination
critic, we have a additional output dense layer (different from
the one that computes QD(y1:t−1, yt)) attached to the discrim-
inator RNN, which estimates VD(y1:t−1) for each timestep.
3.4 Classifier
Given a sentence y1:T , the classifier C with parameters θc
predicts if the sentence belongs to class c ∈ C. Like the
discriminator, it assigns a prediction score at each timestep
QC(y1:t−1, yt, c) for the partial sentence y1:t, which identifies
the probability the sentence belongs to class c. The interme-
diate scores are then averaged to produce the overall score:
C(y1:T , c|θc) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
QC(y1:t−1, yt, c) (7)
The classifier loss LC is based on: 1) L(CR), the cross-
entropy loss on true labeled sentences computed using the
overall classifier sentence score; 2) L(CG) the loss for the fake
sentences. Fake sentences are considered as potentially-noisy
training examples, so we not only minimize cross-entropy loss
but also include Shannon entropyH(C(c|y1:T , θC)).
LC = L(CR) + L(CG)
(8)
L(CR) = E
(y1:T ,c)∼PR(y,c)
[− log C(c|y1:T , θc)]
L(CG) = E
c∼Pc,y1:T∼G
[− log C(c|y1:T , θc)− βH(C(c|y1:T , θC))]
In L(CG), β, the balancing parameter, influences the im-
pact of Shannon entropy. Including H(C(c|y1:T , θC)), for
minimum entropy regularization [Hu et al., 2017], allows the
classifier to predict classes for generated fake sentences more
confidently. This is crucial in reinforcing the generator to pro-
duce sentences of the given class during adversarial training.
Like in discriminator, we include a classification critic Ccrit
to estimate the classifier score QC(y1:t−1, yt, c) for yt based
on the preceding partial sentence y1:t−1,
VC(y1:t−1,c) = E
yt
[QC(y1:t−1, yt, c)] (9)
The implementation of the classifier is similar to the dis-
criminator. We use a unidirectional recurrent neural network
with a dense output layer producing the predicted probability
distribution over classes c ∈ C. The classification critic is also
an alternative head off the classifier RNN with an additional
dense layer estimating VC(y1:t−1,c) for each timestep. We
train this classifier critic by minimizing L(Ccrit),
L(Ccrit) = E
y1:T
T∑
t=1
∥∥QC(y1:t−1, yt, c)− VC(y1:t−1,c)∥∥2 (10)
3.5 Reinforcement Learning Component
We consider a sequential decision making framework, in which
the generator acts as as a reinforcement learning agent. The
current state of the agent is the generated tokens st = y1:t−1
so far. The action yt is the next token to be generated, which is
selected based on the stochastic policy G(yt|y1:t−1, z, c, θg).
The reward the agent receives for the generated sentence y1:T
of a given class c is determined by the discriminator and
classifier. Specifically, we take the overall scores D(y1:T |θd)
(Eqn.3) and C(y1:T , c|θc) (Eqn. 7) and blend them in a manner
reminiscent of the F1 score, producing the sentence reward,
R(y1:T ) = 2 · D(y1:T |θd) · C(y1:T , c|θc)D(y1:T |θd) + C(y1:T , c|θc) (11)
This reward R(y1:T ) is for the entire sentence delivered
during the final timestep, with reward for every other timestep
being zero [Tuan and Lee, 2018]. Thus, the generator agent
seeks to maximize the expected reward, given by,
L(G) = E
y1:T∼G
[
R(y1:T )
]
(12)
To maximize L(G), the generator parameters θg are up-
dated via policy gradients [Sutton et al., 2000]. Specifically,
we use the advantage actor-critic method to solve for opti-
mal policy [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2000]. The expectation in
Eqn. 12 can be re-written using rewards for intermediate time-
steps from the discriminator and classifier. The intermediate
scores from the discriminator, QD(y1:t−1, yt) and the clas-
sifier, QC(y1:t−1, yt, c), are combined as shown in Eqn. 13
and the combined values serve as estimators for Q(y1:t, c),
the expected reward for sentence y1:t. To reduce variance in
the gradient estimates, we replace Q(y1:t, c) by the advan-
tage function Q(y1:t, c)− V (y1:t−1, c), where V (y1:t−1, c) is
given by Eqn. 13. We use α = T − t in Eqn. 14 to increase
the importance of initially-generated tokens while updating θg .
α is a linearly-decreasing factor which corrects the relative
Algorithm 1: spamGAN
1 Input: Labeled dataset DL, Unlabeled dataset DU
2 Parameters: Network parameters θg θd θc θdcrit θccrit
3 Perform pre-training as described in Sec. 3.6
4 for Training-epochs do
5 for G-Adv-epochs do
6 sample batch of classes c from ∼ P (c)
7 generate batch of fake sequences y1:T ∼ G given c
8 for t ∈ 1 : T do
9 compute Q(y1:t, c), V (y1:t−1, c) using Eqn. 13
10 update θg using policy gradient∇θgL(G) in Eqn. 14
11 for G-MLE-epochs do
12 sample batch of real sentences from DL, DU
13 Update θg using MLE in Eqn. 2
14 for D-epochs do
15 sample batch of real sentences from DL, DU
16 sample batch of fake sentences from G
17 update discriminator using∇θdL(D) from Eqn. 4
18 compute QD(y1:t−1, yt), VD(y1:t−1) for fake sentcs
19 update Dcrit using∇θdcritL(Dcrit) from Eqn. 6
20 for C-epochs do
21 sample batch of real sentences-class pairs from DL
22 sample batch of fake sentence-class pairs from G
23 update classifier using∇θcL(C) from Eqn. 8
24 computeQC(y1:t−1, yt, c),VC(y1:t−1,c) on fake sents
25 update Ccrit using∇θccritL(Ccrit) from Eqn. 10
lack of confidence in the initial intermediate scores from the
discriminator and classifier.
Q(y1:t, c) = 2 · QD(y1:t−1, yt) ·QC(y1:t−1, yt, c)
QD(y1:t−1, yt) +QC(y1:t−1, yt, c)
V (y1:t−1, c) = 2 · VD(y1:t−1) · VC(y1:t−1,c)
VD(y1:t−1) + VC(y1:t−1,c)
(13)
During adversarial training, we perform gradient ascent to
update the generator using the gradient equation shown below,
∇θgL(G) = E
y1:T
T∑
t
α
[
Q(y1:t, c)− V (y1:t−1, c)
]
×∇θg log G(yt|y1:t−1, z, c, θg) (14)
3.6 Pre-Training
Before beginning adversarial training, we pre-train the differ-
ent components of spamGAN. The generator G is pre-trained
using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) [Grover et al.,
2018] by updating the parameters via Eqn 2. Once the gen-
erator is pre-trained, we take batches of real sentences from
the labeled dataset DL, the unlabeled dataset DU and fake
sentences sampled from G(y1:T |z, c, θg) to pre-train the dis-
criminator minimizing the lossL(D) in Eqn. 4. The classifier C
is pre-trained solely on real sentences from the labeled dataset
DL. It is trained to minimize the cross-entropy loss L(CR) on
real sentences and their labels. The critic networks Dcrit and
Ccrit are trained by minimizing their loses L(Dcrit) (Eqn. 6) and
Table 1: Accuracy (Mean ± Std) for Different % Labeled Data
Method 10% Labeled 30% 50% 70% 90% 100%
spamGAN-0% 0.700 ± 0.02 0.811 ± 0.02 0.838 ± 0.01 0.845 ± 0.01 0.852 ± 0.02 0.862 ± 0.01
spamGAN-50% 0.678 ± 0.03 0.797 ± 0.03 0.839 ± 0.02 0.845 ± 0.02 0.857 ± 0.02 0.856 ± 0.01
spamGAN-70% 0.695 ± 0.05 0.780 ± 0.03 0.828 ± 0.02 0.850 ± 0.01 0.841 ± 0.02 0.844 ± 0.02
spamGAN-100% 0.681 ± 0.02 0.783 ± 0.02 0.831 ± 0.01 0.837 ± 0.01 0.843 ± 0.02 0.845 ± 0.01
Base classifier 0.722 ± 0.03 0.786 ± 0.02 0.791 ± 0.02 0.829 ± 0.01 0.824 ± 0.02 0.827 ± 0.02
DRI-RCNN 0.647 ± 0.10 0.757 ± 0.01 0.796 ± 0.01 0.834 ± 0.18 0.835 ± 0.02 0.846 ± 0.01
RCNN 0.538 ± 0.09 0.665 ± 0.14 0.733 ± 0.09 0.811 ± 0.03 0.834 ± 0.02 0.825 ± 0.02
Co-Train (Naive Bayes) 0.655 ± 0.01 0.740 ± 0.01 0.738 ± 0.02 0.743 ± 0.01 0.754 ± 0.01 0.774 ± 0.01
PU Learn (Naive Bayes) 0.508 ± 0.02 0.713 ± 0.03 0.816 ± 0.01 0.826 ± 0.01 0.838 ± 0.02 0.843 ± 0.02
L(Ccrit) (Eqn. 10). Such pre-training addresses the problem of
mode collapse [Guo et al., 2018] to a satisfactory extent.
3.7 spamGAN algorithm
Alg. 1 describes spamGAN in detail. After pre-training, we
perform adversarial training for Training-epochs (Lines 4-
25). We create a batch of fake sentences using generator G
by sampling classes c from prior Pc (Lines 6-7). We com-
pute Q(y1:t, c), V (y1:t−1, c) using Eqn. 13 for every timestep
(Line 9). The generator is then updated using policy gradient in
Eqn. 14 (Line 10). This process is repeated for G-Adv-epochs.
Like [Li et al., 2017] the training robustness is greatly im-
proved when the generator is updated using MLE via Eqn 2
on sentences from D (Lines 11-13). We then train the dis-
criminator using real sentences from DL, DU as well as fake
sentences from the generator (Lines 15-16). The discriminator
is updated using Eqn. 4 (Line 17). We also train the discrimina-
tion critic, by computing QD(y1:t−1, yt), VD(y1:t−1) for the
fake sentences and updating the gradients using Eqn. 6 (Line
18-19). This process is repeated for D-epochs. We perform a
similar set of operations for the classifier (Lines 20-25).
4 Experiments
We use the TripAdvisor labeled dataset [Ott et al., 2011] 4,
consisting of 800 truthful reviews on Chicago hotels as well
as 800 deceptive reviews obtained from Amazon Mechanical
Turk. We remove a small number of duplicate truthful reviews,
to get a balanced labeled dataset of 1596 reviews. We augment
the labeled set with 32, 297 unlabeled TripAdvisor reviews for
Chicago hotels 5. All reviews are converted to lower-case and
tokenized at word level, with a vocabulary Y of 10000. The
maximum sequence length is T = 128 words, close to the
median review length of the full dataset.
Y also includes tokens 〈start〉, 〈end〉, 〈unk〉, and 〈pad〉.
〈start〉, 〈end〉 are added to the beginning, end of each sen-
tence. Sentences smaller than T are padded with 〈pad〉 while
longer ones are truncated, ensuring a consistent sentence
length. 〈unk〉 replaces out-of-vocabulary words.
In spamGAN, the generator consists of 2 GRU layers of
1024 units each and an output dense layer providing logits for
the 10, 000 tokens. The generator, discriminator and classi-
fier are trained using ADAM optimizer. All use variational
4http://myleott.com/op-spam.html
5http://times.cs.uiuc.edu/ wang296/Data/index.html
Figure 2: Comparison of spamGAN-50 with Other Approaches
dropout=0.5 between recurrent layers and word embeddings
with dimension 50. For generator, learning rate = 0.001,
weight decay =1 × 10−7. Gradient clipping is set to a max-
imum global norm of 5. The discriminator contains 2 GRU
layers of 512 units each and a dense layer with a single scalar
output and sigmoid activation. The discrimination critic is im-
plemented as an alternative dense layer. Learning rate =0.0001
and weight decay =1× 10−4. The classifier is similar to dis-
criminator. We set balancing coefficient β = 1. The train time
of spamGAN using a Tesla P4 GPU was ∼ 1.5 hrs.
We use a 80−20 train-test split on labeled data. We compare
spamGAN with 2 supervised methods which use recurrent
networks: 1) DRI-RCNN [Zhang et al., 2018]; 2) RCNN [Lai
et al., 2015] as well as 2 semi-supervised methods: 3) Co-
Training [Li et al., 2011] with Naive Bayes classifier; 4) PU
Learning [Herna´ndez et al., 2013] with Naive Bayes (SVM
performed poorly) using only spam and unlabeled reviews.
We conduct experiments with 10, 30, 50, 70, 90, 100% of
labeled data. To analyze the impact of unlabeled data, we
show different versions: spamGAN-0 (no unlabeled data),
spamGAN-50 (50% unlabeled data), spamGAN-70 (70% un-
labeled) and spamGAN-100. Co-Train, PU-Learn results are
for 50% unlabeled data. We also show the performance of our
base classifier (without generator, discriminator, trained on
real labeled data to minimize L(CR)). All experiments are re-
peated 10 times and the mean, standard deviation are reported.
Influence of Labeled Data
Table. 1 shows the classification accuracy of the different mod-
els on the test set. SpamGAN models, in general, outperform
other approaches, especially when the % of labeled data is
limited. When we merely use 10% of labeled data, spamGAN-
0, spamGAN-50, spamGAN-70, spamGAN-100 achieve an
accuracy of 0.70, 0.678, 0.695, 0.681, respectively, which is
Table 2: F1-Score (Mean ± Std) for Different % Labeled Data
Method 10% Labeled 30% 50% 70% 90% 100%
spamGAN-0% 0.718 ± 0.02 0.812 ± 0.02 0.840 ± 0.01 0.848 ± 0.02 0.854 ± 0.02 0.868 ± 0.01
spamGAN-50% 0.674 ± 0.05 0.797 ± 0.03 0.843 ± 0.01 0.848 ± 0.02 0.860 ± 0.02 0.863 ± 0.01
spamGAN-70% 0.702 ± 0.05 0.784 ± 0.03 0.830 ± 0.02 0.856 ± 0.01 0.848 ± 0.02 0.854 ± 0.01
spamGAN-100% 0.684 ± 0.03 0.788 ± 0.03 0.839 ± 0.02 0.844 ± 0.01 0.846 ± 0.02 0.850 ± 0.01
Base classifier 0.731 ± 0.03 0.795 ± 0.03 0.803 ± 0.02 0.829 ± 0.01 0.832 ± 0.02 0.838 ± 0.02
DRI-RCNN 0.632 ± 0.07 0.754 ± 0.02 0.779 ± 0.00 0.812 ± 0.03 0.817 ± 0.03 0.833 ± 0.02
RCNN 0.638 ± 0.01 0.715 ± 0.01 0.754 ± 0.02 0.776 ± 0.05 0.820 ± 0.03 0.833 ± 0.02
Co-Train (Naive Bayes) 0.637 ± 0.02 0.698 ± 0.01 0.680 ± 0.02 0.677 ± 0.01 0.712 ± 0.01 0.726 ± 0.01
PU-Learn (Naive Bayes) 0.050 ± 0.02 0.636 ± 0.05 0.815 ± 0.02 0.837 ± 0.02 0.844 ± 0.02 0.852 ± 0.01
higher than supervised approaches DRI-RCNN (0.647) and R-
CNN (0.538) as well as semi-supervised approaches Co-train
(0.655) and PU-learning (0.508). Even without any unlabeled
data spamGAN-0 gets good results because the mutual boot-
strapping between generator and classifier allows the classifier
to explore beyond the small labeled training set using the fake
sentences produced by the generator. The accuracy of our base
classifier is 0.722, higher than spamGAN models as GANs
needs more samples to train, in general.
The accuracy of all approaches increases with % of labeled
data. We select spamGAN-50 as a representative for compar-
ison in Fig. 2. Though the difference in accuracy between
spamGAN-50 and others reduces as the % of labeled data
increases, spamGAN-50 still performs better than others with
an accuracy of 0.856 when all labeled data are considered.
Table. 2 shows the F1-score. We can again see that
spamGAN-0, spamGAN-50 and spamGAN-70 perform better
than the others, especially when the % of labeled data is small.
Influence of Unlabeled Data
While unlabeled data is used to augment the classifier’s per-
formance, Fig. 3 shows that F1-score slightly decreases when
the % unlabeled data increases, especially for spamGAN-100.
In our case, as unlabeled data is much larger than the labeled,
the generator does not entirely learn the importance of the sen-
tence classes during pre-training (when the unlabeled sentence
classes are randomly assigned), which causes problems for
the classifier during adversarial training. However, when no
unlabeled data is used, the generator easily learns to gener-
ate sentences conditioned on classes paving way for mutual
bootstrapping between classifier and generator. We can also
attribute the drop in performance to the difference in distribu-
tion of data between the unlabeled TripAdvisor reviews and
the handcrafted reviews from Amazon MechanicalTurk.
Perplexity of Generated Sentence
We also compute the perplexity of the sentences produced
by the generator (the lower the value the better). Fig. 4
shows that as the % of unlabeled data increases (spamGAN-
0 to spamGAN-100), the perplexity of the sentences de-
creases. SpamGAN-100, SpamGAN-70 achieve a perplex-
ity of 76.4, 76.5, respectively. Fig. 3, Fig. 4 show that using
unlabeled data improves the generator in producing realistic
sentences but does not fully help to differentiate between the
classes which again, can be attributed to the difference in the
data distribution between the labeled and unlabeled data.
Figure 3: Influence of Unlabeled Data on F1-Score
Figure 4: Influence of Unlabeled Data on Perplexity
Following is a sample (partial) spam sentence produced by
the generator: ”Loved this hotel but i decided to the hotel
in a establishment didnt look bad ...the palmer house was
anyplace that others said in the reviews..”. We notice that spam
sentences use more conservative choice of words, focusing
on adjectives, reviewer, and attributes of the hotel, while non-
spam sentences speak more about the trip in general.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have proposed spamGAN, an approach for detecting opin-
ion spam with limited labeled data. spamGAN, apart from
detecting spam, helps to generate reviews similar to the train-
ing set. Experiments show that spamGAN outperforms state-
of-the-art supervised and semi-supervised techniques when
labeled data is limited. While we use TripAdvisor dataset, we
plan to conduct experiments on YelpZip data (overcoming the
data distribution issue of MechanicalTurk reviews). As the
overall spamGAN architecture is agnostic to the implementa-
tion details of the classifier, we plan to use a more sophisticated
design for classifier than a simple recurrent network.
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